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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION Is NOT
REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH PENNSYLVANIA'S MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE STATUTES PRIOR TO FORECLOSING ON A LOAN
OBTAINED THROUGH ITS FEDERAL LENDING PROGRAM
United States v. Spears (1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) administers a federal
loan program, lending funds to individuals for the purpose of purchas-
ing property and securing the loans with mortgages on the property.,
1. See United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 288-89 (3d Cir. 1988). The
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) is the result of long-standing govern-
ment interest in promoting the agricultural industry in America. Note, Agricul-
tural Law: FmHA Farm Foreclosures, An Analysis of Deferral Relief and the Appeals
System, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 287, 288 (1984). It is the descendant of the Resettle-
ment Administration, which was created during the Depression to help rural
familes become financially self-sufficient. Id. The Resettlement Administration
was renamed the Farm Security Administration in 1938, when it was placed
under the aegis of the Department of Agriculture and proceeded to supply
"credit so farmers could be farm owners, counseling to borrowers, resettlement
projects to establish new farms, and other social and economic programs." Id.
at 289 n.15 (citing 11 N. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAw 966 (1982)). In 1946, the
Farm Security Administration became the FmHA, a similar agency with similar
objectives created "to simplify and improve credit services to promote farm
ownership." Id. at n.16 (quoting 1946 U.S. CODE & CONG. SERV. 1028).
The Housing Act of 1949 (the "Act") had as its objective "a suitable living
environment for every American family." Pub. L. No. 171, 63 Stat. 413 (1949)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982)); Centner, Are FmIHA Loan Enti-
tlements Protected by the Due Process Clause?, 34 DRAKE L. REV. 389, 392-93 (1985).
To this end, the government, through the FmHA, makes funds available for the
purpose of purchasing real estate, for restoring homes to a "safe and habitable"
condition, and for weatherization. Id. at 394 (citing Pub. L. No. 171, § 504, 63
Stat. 413, 414 (1949) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1474 (1982)). The
lending program is geared towards those homeowners, particularly farmers,
who meet the eligibility and loan approval requirements set out in the Act.
Some of the eligibility criteria include "creditworthiness, citizenship ... charac-
ter as it relates to repayment, management ability [and] no credit elsewhere."
Note, supra, at 290 (citations omitted). The prospective borrower must also
meet loan approval criteria including "repayment ability and adequate security."
Id. at 290-91 (citations omitted). If the prospective borrower meets both the
eligibility requirements and the loan approval criteria, he will receive the loan
and, in return, must sign "a Farm and Home Plan, a promissory note, and a
security agreement." Id. (citations omitted).
Originally, virtually all of the loans granted were for farmers, but the Hous-
ing Act of 1961 "expanded the eligibility requirements of [the Act] to include
owners of other real estate in rural areas." Centner, supra, at 394 (citing Pub. L.
No. 87-70, § 803, 75 Stat. 149, 186 (1961) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 147 1(a)(i) (1982)). Further expansion of the qualified pool resulted from the
increased population limit of rural communities in which the agency was permit-
ted to make loans, as delineated in the Housing and Urban Development Act of
(535)
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FmHA procedures, including foreclosure procedures, are generally de-
fined in the agency's regulations. 2 In some circumstances, however, the
regulations do not control. For example, the agency regulations may
not address a particular issue or the parties may contract to comply with
state law. 3 Also, the terms of the mortgage agreement or the procedure
followed may differ from the agency's regulations. 4 Additionally, in
some cases there may be compelling reasons to incorporate state law.
5
In such cases, the provisions of the mortgage agreements are governed
by federal common law, which may derive its content from state law. 6
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1490 (1982) and the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 1490 (1982). See generally A. HIGBY, H. HoFr, E.
SEVERNS &J. HANSEN, FMHA FARM LOAN HANDBOOK 57 (1982).
2. See Regulations of the Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15
(1988).
3. See Centner, supra note 1, at 415. The contractual nature of the arrange-
ment is an important aspect of the relationship between the parties. It is impor-
tant to note that the relationship is voluntary, and that "FmHA borrowers want
[] to be homeowners and [are] willing to enter into agreements with the govern-
ment to facilitate the acquisition of their own homes." Id. (emphasis added).
Taking into consideration the voluntary nature of the obligations that the bor-
rowers accept and the notice they receive regarding the consequences of default,
it seems equitable to allow the FmHA to foreclose in accordance with the provi-
sions set forth in the mortgage agreements-i.e., to allow the regulations to give
content to federal law when the foreclosure proceedings take place in federal
court. Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's consideration of the mortgage
contract's provisions regulating foreclosure proceedings in Spears, see infra notes
33-35 and accompanying text.
4. Regulations of the Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15(d)(2)
(1988). The FmHA regulations provide: "A State Supplement may be issued if
[the Office of the General Counsel] advises different or additional language or
format is required to comply with State laws or if notice and mailing instructions
are different than that outlined in this paragraph." Id. For further discussion of
this provision, see infra note 34.
5. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a dis-
cussion of Kimbell, see infra note 37 and accompanying text. See also United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). The Yazell Court found significant the fact
that a Small Business Administration (SBA) loan to the Yazells was a "custom-
made, hand-tailored, specifically negotiated transaction." Id. at 348. The Court
also implied that the local SBA agents who had set up the loan knew about the
state law in question and should have covered the possibility of coverture block-
ing collection of their loan in the loan documents. Id. at 346-48. The Court also
held that
[b]oth theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for
state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property ar-
rangements. They should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state inter-
ests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied.
Id. at 352.
6. See United States v. Spears, 859 F.2d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 1988). The
Supreme Court has held that contractual arrangements arising out of federal
lending programs are governed by federal law. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 726; see
also Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). In
Clearfield Trust, the Supreme Court held that federal law governed actions of the
536
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Recently, in United States v. Spears,7 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit was confronted with the issue of whether fed-
eral common law required the FmHA to comply with Pennsylvania's pre-
foreclosure statutes. 8 The Third Circuit concluded that the parties did
not contract to comply with state law and that there was no compelling
reason to choose state law as the rule of decision.9 In so doing, the
court provided practitioners in the Third Circuit with a clear formula as
to when federal agencies must comply with state foreclosure laws before
foreclosing on a mortgage obtained through a federal loan program.' 0
II. FACTS
In 1981, Marcus and Doris Spears purchased property in Penn-
sylvania, aided by a loan from the FmHA which was secured by a mort-
gage on the property.'I The Spears made payments on the property
until June 1982, after which the couple separated and departed the
property.12 In October 1982 and January 1983, the FmHA wrote to Do-
ris Rivera (formerly Doris Spears), informing her that she had violated
the mortgage agreement and that her interest credit had been can-
celled. 13 She was further advised to either sell the property or refinance
federal government which are based on constitutionally delineated powers. Id.
at 366. In reaching its decision, the Clearfield Trust court stated:
When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exer-
cising a constitutional function or power .... [Such disbursements and
payments have their] origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the
United States and [are] in no way dependent on the laws . . . of any
other state .... In absence of an applicable act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their
own standards.
Id. at 366-67.
7. 859 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1988).
8. Id. at 285. For a discussion of the facts of Spears, see infra notes 11-28
and accompanying text.
9. Spears, 859 F.2d at 285. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding
and reasoning in Spears, see infra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of this formula, see infra notes 89-91 and accompany-
ing text.
11. Spears, 859 F.2d at 285. Along with the loan, the Spears received an
"interest credit" from the FmHA because of their low family income. Id. The
credit served to greatly reduce the monthly mortgage payments. Id.
12. Id. The Spears court referred to the defendant, Doris Spears, as Ms.
Rivera (her maiden name, which she resumed after her divorce) throughout the
opinion. Id. Marcus Spears, the defendant's former husband, was deceased at
the time of the present action. Id. Prior to Mr. Spears' death, the couple had
separated and Rivera moved to Puerto Rico, where she had planned to stay for
"three to four months." Id. While in Puerto Rico, Mrs. Spears obtained a di-
vorce and resumed use of her maiden name. Id. She remained in Puerto Rico
until she moved to her daughter's house in Allentown, Pennsylvania, in July
1983. Id. at 285-86.
13. Id. The letters noted that abandonment of the mortgaged property and
failure to make payments under the mortgage agreement were violations of the
3
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the mortgage and discharge her debt to the government." In March
1984, the FmHA again wrote to Rivera, informing her that in response
to her default on her loan, the agency planned to accelerate the loan and
foreclose on her property. 15 In addition, she was given notice of her
right to a hearing before such foreclosure took place. 16 Without ever
having responded to any of the FmHA's letters, Rivera moved back onto
the property in November 1985.17
In mid-1985, the government began foreclosure proceedings in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.',
On remand from the district court the FmHA determined that the prop-
erty in question had been abandoned and that foreclosure proceedings
should continue in the district court.19 The district court agreed with
the agency's determinations and refused to stop foreclosure proceed-
ings. 20 However, relying on United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. ,21 the dis-
trict court held that the FmHA was required to comply with the
Pennsylvania statutes governing pre-foreclosure proceedings known as
Acts 6 and 91.22 These statutes require a mortgagee to give thirty days
written notice of its intention to begin foreclosure proceedings. 23 In
mortgage agreement. Id. The FmHA sent identical letters to both Rivera and
Spears, until his death. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 286. Each letter that Rivera received listed procedures that she
could follow in order to cure the default on her loan. Id. These included "mak-
ing specified payments, transferring the property to another person in accord-
ance with agency regulations, or refinancing the mortgage." Id.
16. Id. Rivera was informed that by submitting a written request within 30
days, she would be entitled to an administrative hearing. Id.
17. Id. The Third Circuit noted that Rivera "has lived [on the property]
since [then] without paying any installment on the mortgage." Id. This fact did
not significantly enter into the court's decision; the Spears court referred to Ri-
vera's continued use of the property without payment only in the factual portion
of its opinion.
18. Id. The district court disposed of some preliminary matters and, with
the parties' consent, "remanded the case to the FmHA for administrative deter-
minations." Id.
19. Id The agency determined that the property had been abandoned
from July 1982 until December 1985. Id. This determination was made follow-
ing "a hearing and an appeal to the state director." Id.
20. Id. Rivera appealed the agency's determination based on her assertion
that she had not, in fact, abandoned the property. Id. The district court af-
firmed this portion of the agency's determination, however, finding that the
agency's determination regarding the abandonment of the property had been
supported with substantial evidence and, consequently, that Rivera's appeal had
been properly denied. Id.
21. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). For a discussion of Kimbell, see infra note 37 and
accompanying text.
22. Spears, 859 F.2d at 286 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 401-408 (Pur-
don Supp. 1988) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1680.401c (Purdon Supp. 1988)).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 403(a) (Purdon Supp. 1988). In pertinent part,
Act 6 provides:
(a) Befbre any residential mortgage lender may... commence any
[Vol. 34: p. 535
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addition, the mortgagor must be provided with a list of consumer credit
counseling agencies and informed of the right to apply for financial
assistance from a state program.2 4 Because the FmHA failed to comply
with the Pennsylvania statutes, the district court remanded the case to
the agency.
25
legal action including mortgage foreclosure . . . or take possession of
any security of the residential mortgage debtor for such residential
mortgage obligation, such person shall give the residential mortgage
debtor notice of such intention at least thirty days in advance as pro-
vided in this section.
(b) Notice of intention to take action as specified in subsection (a)
of this section shall be in writing....
(c) The written notice shall clearly and conspicuously state:
(1) The particular obligation or real estate security interest;
(2) The nature of the default claimed;
(3) The right of the debtor to cure the default as provided in
section 404 of this act and exactly what performance including
what sum of money, if any, must be tendered to cure the default;
(4) The time within which the debtor must cure the default;
(5) The method or methods by which the debtor's ownership
or possession of the real estate may be terminated; and
(6) The right of the debtor, if any, to transfer the real estate to
another person subject to the security interest or to refinance the
obligation and of the transferee's right, if.any, to cure the default.
Id. § 403(a)-(c).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1680.403c(a), (b) (Purdon Supp. 1988). In per-
tinent part, Act 91 states:
(a) Any mortgagee who desires to foreclose upon a mortgage shall
send to such mortgagor at this [sic] or her last known address the no-
tice provided in subsection (b): Provided, [sic] however, That such
mortgagor shall be at least sixty (60) days contractually delinquent in
his mortgage payments or be in violation of any other provision of such
mortgage.
(b) The agency [Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency] shall pre-
pare a uniform notice for purposes of this section as follows: The no-
tice shall list consumer credit counseling agencies and shall advise the
mortgagor of his delinquency or other default under the mortgage and
that such mortgagor has thirty (30) days to have a face-to-face meeting
with the mortgagee who sent the notice or a consumer credit counsel-
ing agency to attempt to resolve the delinquency or default by restruc-
turing the loan payment schedule or otherwise .... The notice shall
include a statement that, if the mortgagor is unable to resolve the delin-
quency or default within thirty (30) calendar days of the mortgagor's
first contact with either the mortgagee or a consumer credit counseling
agency, the mortgagor may apply to the agency or its duly authorized
agent at the address and phone number listed in the notice in order to
obtain an application and information regarding the Homeowner's
Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program .... During the time that the
application [to the Assistance Program] is pending, no mortgagee may
commence legal action to foreclose upon its mortgage with the
mortgagor.
Id.
25. Spears, 859 F.2d at 286. The district court found that compliance with
the statutes would not impose a "substantial administrative burden on the gov-
ernment." Id. Further, the court noted that FmHA mortgagors would not re-
5
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Rivera appealed the agency's determination and the district court's
affirmance that she had in fact abandoned the property and thus was not
entitled to relief in the form of a stay of the foreclosure proceedings. 26
The government cross-appealed the district court's holding that it was
required to comply with the state's pre-foreclosure statutes.2 7 The
FmHA asserted that compliance with the agency's regulations, which
provided for adequate notice and an opportunity for a hearing, was
sufficient.
28
III. DIscussION
The Third Circuit began its analysis by determining that jurisdiction
was proper.2 9 It then turned its attention to the main issue-whether,
ceive "additional substantive benefits" by application of the state laws
(presumably to the detriment of the FmHA). Id. Finally, the district court found
that national uniformity in administration of the lending program was unneces-
sary and that application of the Pennsylvania statutes instead of the federal regu-
lations would not "frustrate the objectives" of the program. Id.
In light of these findings, the district court found that the Supreme Court's
holding in Kimbell was controlling and held that the FmHA was required to com-
ply with the state statutes. Id. Thus, the court dismissed both parties' motions
for summary judgment. Id. The district court noted, however, that once the
agency complied with the Pennsylvania statutes, it could renew its motion for
summary judgment. Id. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Kimbell, see
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
26. Spears, 859 F.2d at 286. Rivera argued on appeal that the district court
had erred in finding that the agency's evidence regarding her abandonment of
the property was sufficient. Id.
27. Id. The FmHA argued that it was not required to comply with state
statutes which effectively restricted its rights as mortgagee against its mortgagor.
Id. The FmHA regulations, however, provide that, in some circumstances, the
FmHA must comply with state law. See Regulations of the Department of Agri-
culture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15(d) (2) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 4, and for a further discussion of the provision, see iifra note 34.
28. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1475, 14 80(g), (k) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); Regulations of the Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R.
§ 1955.15 (1986)). The regulations provided that to effectuate foreclosure, the
borrower's account must be accelerated. See Regulations of the Department of
Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15 (1988). The FmHA was required to send notice
of acceleration by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the last known ad-
dress. Id. § 1955.15(d)(2). If a signed receipt was returned, no further notice
was necessary, and a copy of the notice was sent to a hearing officer. Id
In 1987, the FmHA promulgated more detailed foreclosure notice regula-
tions. See id. § 1951.312. However, the FmHA regulations still do not require
the agency to provide a list of consumer credit agencies, as mandated by Penn-
sylvania's Act 91. Compare id. with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1608.401c(b) (Purdon
Supp. 1988). In addition, FmHA regulations continue to provide that in some
circumstances the agency must comply with state law. See Regulations of the
Department of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15(d)(2) (1988).
29. Spears, 859 F.2d at 286. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Scirica,
Sloviter and Weis. Id. at 285. Judge Weis delivered the opinion of the court. Id.
It is interesting to note thatJudge Weis also wrote the court's opinion in United
States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1986), a case in
which the Third Circuit held that state law, not a federal agency's regulations,
540
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prior to foreclosing on Rivera's property, the FmHA was required to
gave content to federal law. For a discussion of Walter Dunlap, see infra note 48
and accompanying text.
Addressing the jurisdictional issues, the Third Circuit first noted that the
district court's denial of summary judgment to both parties and remand of the
case to the agency level were interlocutory steps, not final orders, hence "gener-
ally not appealable." Spears, 859 F.2d at 286-87 (citing United Steel Workers of
Am. Local 1913 v. Union R.R., 648 F.2d 905, 909 (3d Cir. 1981); Boeing Co. v.
International Union, 370 F.2d 969, 970 (3d Cir. 1967); Marshall v. Celebrezze,
351 F.2d 467, 468 (3d Cir. 1965)).
The Third Circuit found, however, that given the procedural posture of
Spears, if the FmHA were to comply with the Pennsylvania statutes as the district
court had ordered, the issue of whether or not they were required to do so
would become moot, hence unappealable. Id. at 287. If the FmHA refused to
comply, and no appeal were allowed, the issue would, in the court's words, "re-
main in limbo." Id. Thus the Spears court applied an exception to the general
rule of nonappealability because "denial of appellate review before remand to
the agency would foreclose appellate review as a practical matter." Id. (quoting
AJA Assoc. v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 817 F.2d 1070, 1073 (3d Cir. 1987)). See
also Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1702, UMW, 683 F.2d 827, 831 (4th Cir.
1982) (in case involving appeal of contempt convictions, union officials were
allowed to appeal "[b]ecause the union officials [were] no longer parties to the
main claim, [and therefore] they [had] no other opportunity for review of their
contempt convictions").
The Third Circuit also found that it could, under the doctrine of pendent
appellate jurisdiction, properly excercise its discretion and decide any collateral
issues in the case, such as the sufficiency of the FmHA's evidence supporting its
discontinuance of its financial relationship with Rivera. Spears, 859 F.2d at 287
("[O]nce we have taken jurisdiction over one issue in a case, we may, in our
discretion, consider otherwise nonappealable issues in the case as well, where
'[t]here is sufficient overlap in the factors relevant to [the appealable and nonap-
pealable] issues to warrant our exercising plenary authority over [the] appeal.' ")
(quoting San Filippo v. United States Trust Co., 737 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985)). See also Intermedics Infusaid, Inc. v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129, 134 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("[I]n connection
with review of [an] appealable interlocutory order, other interlocutory orders,
which ordinarily would be nonappealable standing alone, may be reviewed.");
Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Although dismissal
of plaintiff's claim against Marcus was not a final judgment, and Rule 54(b) certi-
fication was not entered as to that dismissal, since all of the issues involved in plain-
tiff's cross-appeal of that order are involved in the federal defendant's appeal, we accept
pendent jurisdiction of the cross-appeal.") (emphasis added); Sanders v. Levy, 558
F.2d 636, 643 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd en banc, 558 F.2d 646, 647-48 (1977).
The court noted that the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction could
easily become the subject of abuse, allowing litigants with nonappealable claims
to get those issues before the court by bringing them in conjunction with an
appealable, but unimportant claim which normally would not be appealed.
Spears, 859 F.2d at 287. Judge Sloviter based her dissent on this issue, stating
that the majority's "adoption of a discretionary standard of appellate jurisdiction
over collateral matters will be improvident in the long run, consigning this court
to a plethora of disputations over where the line should be drawn in future ap-
peals." Id. at 292 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting).
Judge Sloviter also disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Kershner
v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982). Id. (Sloviter, J., concurring and
dissenting). In Kershner, the Third Circuit had "limited the scope of an appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) to issues intertwined with the preliminary injunction
itself." Spears, 859 F.2d at 288. Judge Sloviter felt that Spears and Kershner were
7
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comply with the Pennsylvania statutes.3 11 As a preliminary matter, the
court noted that the mortgage was "a contractual obligation subject to
federal law," 3'3 and that federal law could derive its content from state
law.3
2
The court first examined the mortgage contract to determine
whether the FmHA had contracted to comply with state law in the area
of foreclosure proceedings. 33 The court found that while the provisions
not distinguishable and stated in her dissent that "[t]he issues in the govern-
ment's appeal and Ms. Rivera's appeal are not 'inextricably intertwined,' as re-
quired under Kershner." Id. at 293 (Sloviter, J., concurring and dissenting).
Thus, -according to Judge Sloviter, while the government's appeal was properly
before the court, Rivera's was not. Id. at 292 (Sloviter, J., concurring and
dissenting).
The court also allowed the appeal because the issue of whether the federal
agency must comply with a state law "is significant in the day-to-day operation of
the agency and has spawned conflicting district court decisions within [the
Third] [C]ircuit." Spears, 859 F.2d at 287. See, e.g., United States v. Royer, 683
F. Supp. 484, 486 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (case involving foreclosure proceedings initi-
ated by FmHA held that mortgage contract "authorized the government to fore-
close solely in compliance with federal law"), aff'd, 815 F.2d 696 (3d Cir. 1987);
United States v. Black, 622 F. Supp. 669, 672 (W.D. Pa. 1985) ("This court holds
that these federal statutes and regulations regarding a mortgage foreclosure by a
federal agency [FmHA] preempt the field with respect to a federal agency's rem-
edies and procedures on default and may not be superceded [sic] by conflicting
state legislation."). Further, the court determined that the issue was "purely
one of law," and no further factual evidence was being sought in Spears. 859
F.2d at 287. Finally, the court stated that in Spears, "considerations ofjudicial
economy, the litigant's interests, and practicality demand that we exercise juris-
diction over the Rivera appeal." Id. at 288.
30. Spears, 859 F.2d at 288. Interestingly, the Third Circuit noted that
the notice given by the FmHA here appears to cover substantially the
items listed in the state statute. Furthermore, Act 6 provides that the
notice 'shall not be required where the residential mortgage debtor []
has abandoned ... the property.' As a consequence, it is questionable
whether notice was mandated by this Act in any event. Act 91 demands
notification to the mortgagor and grants time to apply to a state agency
for financial assistance before foreclosure may proceed.
Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
For a discussion of the notice given by the FmHA, see supra notes 13-16 and
accompanying text. For the text of Acts 6 and 91, see supra notes 23 & 24,
respectively.
31. Spears, 859 F.2d at 289 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943)). For a brief discussion of Cleafield Trust, see supra note 6.
32. 859 F.2d at 289 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.
715, 718 (1979); United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232,
1235 (3d Cir. 1986)). For a discussion of Kinibell, see infra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of Walter Dunlap, see infra note 48 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of when the FmHA may be governed by federal
common law which is defined by state law, see supra notes 3-6 and accompanying
text.
33. Spears, 859 F.2d at 289. The Spears court quoted passages from the
mortgage contract which it felt were relevant to the question. Id. Paragraph 17
of the contract stated that in the event of a borrower's default, "the Govern-
ment, at its option, with or without notice, inav: . . .declare the entire amount
8
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of the mortgage contract indicated that the government could use state
law in foreclosure proceedings, it was not obligated to do so. 34 The
court based its interpretation on the consistent use of the word "may" in
the contractual provisions relating to use of state law in foreclosure pro-
ceedings, rather than "shall" or "must," words which, in the Spears
court's opinion, would oblige the government to utilize state foreclosure
procedures instead of those set forth in the agency regulations.3 5
Having determined that the mortgage contract did not specify
which law was to be used, the Third Circuit determined the proper rule
of decision. The Third Circuit stated that the determination of
"whether to adopt state law or to fashion a uniform federal rule rests on
judicial policy drawn from the nature of the specific governmental inter-
est at stake and the effect of applying state law." '3 6 In determining
whether there was a compelling reason to incorporate state law in Spears,
the Third Circuit first examined United States v. Kimbell, Inc. ,7 where the
unpaid under the note . . . due and payable . . . [or] foreclose this instrument as
provided herein or by law." Id. (emphasis added).
Paragraph 21 stated, "[t]his instrument shall be subject to the present regu-
lations of the Farmers Home Administration, and to its future regulations not
inconsistent with express provisions hereof." Id.
Paragraph 23 stated that the borrower agreed that in the event of his own
default, "the Government may foreclose this instrument as authorized or permitted by the
laws then existing of the jurisdiction where the property is situated and of the United
States of America, on terms and conditions satisfactory to the Government .... "
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the importance of the contractual na-
ture of the arrangement, see supra note 3.
34. Spears, 859 F.2d at 289. The court stated that "[a] fair reading of the
mortgage documents reveals that the FmHA 'may' utilize state foreclosure pro-
cedures." Id. The court also noted that "no contractual clause binds the gov-
ernment to utilize state law in foreclosure." Id.
The Spears court also cited an FmHA regulation which dealt with forms to
be used in cases of acceleration of accounts. Id. "The regulation stated that '[a]
State Supplement may be issued if the ,[Office of the General Counsel] advises
different or additional language or format is required to comply with State laws
or if notice and mailing instructions are different from that outlined in this para-
graph.' " Id. (citing 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15(d)(2) (1986)). In a footnote, the court
noted that the language of this regulation could require the FmHA to comply
with state pre-foreclosure procedures like Pennsylvania's when state law is used
to foreclose on mortgages in default, but noted that because the FmHA in Spears
was using the federal court and federal procedures to foreclose on the mort-
gage, this language imposed no obligation on the FmHA. Id. at 289 n.3.
35. Id. at 289. The court cited no particular authority for its interpretation
of the force of the words "may," "shall" and "must." The court merely stated
that its interpretation was "a fair reading." Id.
36. Id.
37. 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Kimbell involved a small supermarket corporation,
O.K. Super Markets, Inc. (O.K.), which borrowed funds from Kimbell, which
secured its loan with a lien on O.K.'s merchandise and equipment. Id. at 719.
Subsequently, O.K. obtained a loan from a Texas bank, which also secured its
loan with a lien on O.K.'s merchandise and equipment. Id. The Small Business
Administration (SBA) guaranteed the bank's loan. Id. O.K. defaulted on both of
the loans. Id. Kimbell filed suit and subsequently obtained a favorable judg-
ment in the state court. Id. at 719-20. The SBA paid off the bank's loan and
9
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Supreme Court held that the priority of liens stemming from federal
programs was to be determined with reference to federal common law,
which was to derive its content from the applicable state law unless Con-
gress had previously indicated that its own directives would govern the
situation.3 8 The Spears court articulated the Kimbell analysis, setting out
the factors which the Kimbell court stated were to be taken into consider-
accepted assignment of the bank's security lien on O.K.'s property. Id. Subse-
quently, O.K. sold its equipment and inventory and placed the proceeds in es-
crow. Id. at 720. Kimbell, pursuant to its favorable judgment, sought to
foreclose its lien, and filed suit in district court, claiming that its interest in the
escrow account was greater than the SBA's. Id.
In a companion case to Kimbell, United States v. Crittenden, debtor Ralph
Bridges obtained a loan from the FmHA, securing it with an interest in his crops
and farm equipment. Id. at 723. Bridges, in the course of running his farm, had
his tractor repaired by Crittenden and was unable to pay the repair bills. Id.
Crittenden retained the tractor. Id. Subsequently, Bridges filed for bankruptcy,
and the United States filed suit to obtain Bridges' tractor, claiming that its secur-
ity interest was superior to Crittenden's repairman's lien. Id. at 724. In both
cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had addressed the
issue of priority by fashioning a federal rule to give content to the federal law
which governed the situation. Id. at 722-24. For the prior history of these cases,
see Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex.
1975), rev'd, 557 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Crittenden, Civ. Ac-
tion No. 75-37-COL (M.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 1975), rev'd in part, 563 F.2d 678 (5th
Cir. 1977).
The issue to be decided in Kimbell was whether liens arising from federal
loan programs take precedence over private liens in the absence of a federal
statute setting priorities. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 718. The Supreme Court held that
determination of this issue required the application of federal law, which, until
Congress directed otherwise, was to be given content with state law pertaining
to the issue. Id. at 726, 729. The Court found that application of state law was
appropriate in Kimbell because: (1) no national rule was needed to protect the
interests of the federal lenders, id. at 729; (2) application of state law did not
interfere with proper administration of the federal lending programs, id. at 733;
(3) Congress, which had the power to displace state law if it felt that federal
programs required the protection of priority setting legislation, had not done so,
id. at 735; and (4) rejection of established commercial laws in each state could
undermine the stability of the commercial communities which based their trans-
actions on state commercial law, id. at 739-40.
The Kimbell Court placed special emphasis on the last criterion, stating that
in cases involving commercial creditors whose lien status was based on state law,
"the prudent course is to adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal
rule of decision until Congress strikes a different accommodation." Id. at 740.
The Court noted its desire to, as far as possible, avoid changing the status quo in
the area of commerce. Id. Specifically, the Court stated, "[b]ecause the ultimate
consequences of altering settled commercial practices are so difficult to foresee,
we hesitate to create new uncertainties, in the absence of careful legislative de-
liberation." Id. at 739-40.
See generally Greig & Althoff, The Kimbell Decision: Applying State Laws as the
Federal Rule of Decision in Priority Disputes Between Federal Agency and State, Private and
Consensual Liens, 86 COM. L.J. 447 (1981) (in-depth discussion of reasoning in
Kimbell and probable effects on future cases involving similar situations). For a
discussion of the Spears court's application of Kimbell, see infra notes 37-46 and
accompanying text.
38. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 726, 729.
[Vol. 34: p. 535
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ation in evaluating the government's interest in having a uniform rule
fashioned to serve its needs. 3 ) These factors include the possibility that
the federal program in question might need a single national standard
to transact its business with certainty, the possibility that applying state
law to situations involving the federal lender would "frustrate specific
objectives of the federal program" and the possibility that application of
a federal rule would "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on
state law." 40
The Third Circuit applied the Kimbell analysis to the facts in Spears,
examining whether efficient administration of the FmHA loan program
required a single national standard. 4 ' The mortgage contracts used by
the FmHA provided for discretionary use of state law.4 2 The court
stated that these provisions clearly indicated that fashioning a uniform
rule was unnecessary. 4 3
The court next turned its attention to whether the application of
state law would frustrate the aims of the FmHA program. The court
again noted that the FmHA had the "contractual alternative to employ
state procedures." '4 4 The court stated that this discretionary use of state
law suggests that, at times, state law is compatible with the FmHA pro-
grams. 4 5 Further, the court stated that "[e]fficient operation of the fed-
eral program conceivably could be improved through the FmHA's
decision to utilize state law." '4 6 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that a
uniform federal rule was unnecessary and that the application of state
law would not frustrate the purposes of the FmHA loan program.
The Third Circuit next evaluated the impact that application of the
FmHA regulations would have on concerned commercial interests. The
court stated that the "critical factor" which would determine whether
state law or uniform federal law would apply was the threat that applica-
tion of a federal rule would impose on commercial expectations founded
39. Spears, 859 F.2d at 289. For a brief discussion of Kimbell and the factors
examined by the Kimbell court, see supra note 37.
40. Spears, 859 F.2d at 289 (citing Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728-29). For a discus-
sion of the objectives of the FmHA lending program, see supra note 1.
41. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290.
42. Id. This provision seems to indicate that even the FmHA did not con-
template that use of state law would frustrate the efficient administration of the
program. For a discussion of relevant provisions of the mortgage contract, see
supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
43. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290. The court stated that "the contractual arrange-
ments giving the FmHA an option to utilize state procedures conclusively
demonstrate that no need for national uniformity is present." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. In support of this position, the court pointed out that several state
statutes allow mortgagees to sell properties in the event of default "without the
delay and expense of foreclosure." Id. Presumably, the court was implying that
adoption of such statutes would permit the FmHA to more easily collect on
loans in default than would the agency's own procedures.
1989]
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on state law.4 7 The Spears court noted that in Kimbell and United States v.
I1alter Dunlap & Sons, Inc. ,'48 the parties seeking relief from application of
a federal rule were not debtors involved in the federal loan program in
question, but were instead third parties with commercial interests in the
property which the government was seeking to seize pursuant to foreclo-
sure proceedings. 4'1 As such, the Spears court noted, the interested third
47. Id. In Spears, the only interested parties were the FmHA, which sought
to foreclose and take possession of the property in which it held a security inter-
est, and Rivera, the debtor. Since no third party interests were involved, there
were no collateral commercial considerations.
48. 800 F.2d 1232 (3d Cir. 1986). In Walter Dunlap, the Third Circuit held
that state law, not a federal agency's regulations, gave content to federal law in a
determination of the status of the agency's lien on collateral sold by the debtor.
Id. at 1239. Walter Dunlap involved an action for conversion brought by the gov-
ernment against a broker who sold a debtor's livestock which had served as col-
lateral for the debtor's loan from the FmHA. Id. at 1234. The price realized at
auction was insufficient to cover the debtor's total debts and, following the
debtor's filing a petition in bankruptcy, the FmHA filed suit against the broker
seeking to recover the gross proceeds, including the broker's commission, real-
ized at the sale. Id. at 1234-35.
Most significantly, the Third Circuit held that the FmHA's regulations re-
garding proper application of the sale proceeds did not control over established
state law, which permitted alternate allocation of the funds. Id. at 1239. Secon-
darily, the court held that even if the regulations did apply, proper classification
of the livestock as a "normal," rather than a "basic" security, rendered the gov-
ernment's argument ineffectual, because a normal security could be sold and the
proceeds applied in the manner exercised by the debtor in Walter Dunlap. Id.
Essentially, as the court noted, the importance of the distinction between normal
and basic securities "lies in the fact that payment of routine living and farm op-
erating expenses is permissible when normal income security is involved, but
not when the collateral is basic security." Id. The court noted that basic securi-
ties included "all equipment (including fixtures in U.C.C. states) and foundation
herds . . . securing FmHA loans which serve as a basis for the farming or the
operation outlined in ... the Farm and Home Plan ... and replacement of such
property." Id. The court found that normal securities included "all security not
considered basic security including crops, livestock ... and other property ...
which are sold in operating the farm." Id. (quoting 7 C.F.R. § 1962.17 (1986)).
The Third Circuit held that the government's interest in having its loan re-
paid was not paramount and that its security interest in the debtor's property
could not be collected in accordance with federal agency regulations to the det-
riment of the third party broker, whose interest in the property-his commission
on the sale-was based on state law. See id. For a discussion of the Spears court's
application of Walter Dunlap, see infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290. In Kinibell, the relative rights of two interested
parties other than the debtor were at issue. Kinibell, 440 U.S. at 718. The Small
Business Administration, guarantor of the debtor's loan, sought to collect the
escrowed proceeds from the sale of equipment which had secured the loan to
the debtor. Id. at 719-20. Kimbell, a grocery wholesaler that had made credit
sales to the debtor, also sought to collect the proceeds based on its own security
interest in the debtor's equipment. Id. When Kimbell moved to foreclose on its
lien, the present action between the two secured parties ensued. Id. at 720.
Walter Dunlap also involved two parties, neither of which was the debtor.
Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1234-35. The FmHA sought to collect the gross pro-
ceeds, including the broker's commission, from the sale of livestock in which the
government held a security interest. Id. at 1234. The proceeds from the sale
546
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parties had relied on the "intricate network of state laws regulating com-
mercial activities" to perfect their security interests. 50 Further, the
court stated that the federal programs were interfering in commercial
areas in which the priority of the private liens had already been estab-
lished in accordance with state laws. 5 1 The court implied that this inter-
ference would not necessarily further any federal interest, while private
interests stood to be harmed to a great extent. 52 Thus, the court con-
cluded that application of state law was appropriate in both Kimbell and
Walter Dunlap.53
The Third Circuit found that the considerations in Kimbell and Wal-
ter Dunlap did not require application of state law in Spears because no
third parties were involved in the action. 54 Contrasting the cases involv-
ing third party creditors with those involving only the government and
the debtor, the court cited West Virginia v. United States.55 The Third Cir-
were insufficient to discharge the entire debt to the government. Id. Walter
Dunlap, the brokers who had sold the debtor's livestock, claimed that under
state law the government's security interest had been discharged, thus the gov-
ernment had no right to the money. Id. at 1235. The relative rights of these
secured parties, not the debtor, were at issue in that case.
In contrast, the party seeking relief in Spears was the debtor herself, not a
third party with a commercial interest. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. See also United
States v. West Virginia, 479 U.S. 305 (1987). For a discussion of W Vest Virginia,
see infra note 54 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
341 (1966). For a discussion of Yazell, see supra note 5.
50. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290-91. The Third Circuit further noted that the
statutes upon which the injured parties in Walter Dunlap and Kimbell had based
their security interests were ones "on which private creditors base their daily
commercial transactions." Id. at 289 (quoting Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 729). The
court emphasized the drastic effect that giving all federal security interests prior-
ity over private security interests would have on the justifiable expectations of
private creditors. Id. at 289-90. For a discussion of Kimbell, see supra note 37
and accompanying text. For a discussion of Walter Dunlap, see supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
51. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290-91. The Spears court further noted that the third
party creditors in both Kimbell and Walter Dunlap "would have been prejudiced
by a federal rule preempting the state system of lien priorities of general applica-
bility" because they would have depended on the state system in perfecting their
security interests. Id. at 289. For a further discussion of the preemption issue,
see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
52. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. The court actually stated that "[f]ederal inter-
ests would not suffer and private businesses would benefit, by accommodating
state law." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court also noted that no state interest was involved because the
only possible area of interest-clear title to real estate-was not threatened by
possible application of federal regulations. Id. The FmHA notice regulations,
stated the court, did not affect recording of deeds following foreclosure pro-
ceedings. Id. Further, purchase of property at a federal foreclosure sale did not
"create a cloud on the title." Id.
55. 479 U.S. 305 (1987). (Eest 'iginia involved a suit brought by the gov-
ernment against West Virginia for payment of a past due debt plus prejudgment
interest. Id. at 307. *The district court agreed with West Virginia's assertion that
it was not liable for the interest because it had not consented to be, as required
1989]
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cult noted that "when the controversy does not affect third parties but
embroils only the United States and a debtor, the factors that favor ap-
plying state law are considerably weakened if not removed entirely from
consideration. "56
Further, the court found that Pennsylvania debtors would derive no
particular benefit from application of the state laws instead of the federal
regulations. 57 In the instant case in particular, the court found that pro-
visions of the state law would not help Rivera because she was probably
ineligible for the refinancing possibility offered by the program under
the Pennsylvania statutes. 51 Thus, the court found that "[a]dherence to
non-productive procedures that only result in additional expense and
delay fails to support grafting state procedures on to a federal
program. ' ' 9
The Third Circuit concluded that the absence of an outside com-
mercial interest or third party in Spears rendered the Kimbell-Walter Dun-
lap analysis inapplicable. 60 Rather, the Spears court felt that West Virginia
by state law, but the Fourth Circuit reversed. Id. at 307-08. The Supreme Court
affirmed the Fourth Circuit and held that West Virginia, under federal law, was
obliged to pay the interest. Id.
Applying the first two prongs of the Kimbell test, the Supreme Court in Wlest
Viginia found that "[a] single nationwide rule would be preferable to one turn-
ing on state law, and the incorporation of state law would not give due regard to
the federal interest in maintaining the apportionment of responsibility Congress
devised in the DRA [Diaster Relief Act]." Id. at 309. Thus, the Court found
that the federal government's interest in subjecting its contractual relations with
states to "a single nationwide rule" was compelling, and that subjecting such
relations to a federal rule would not "disrupt commercial relations predicated
on state law." Id. (quoting Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 729). The Court thus applied a
federal rule, rather than state law, and forced West Virginia to pay prejudgment
interest to the United States. Id. at 311. The Court felt that the United States'
interest in "complete compensation" for services rendered to states outweighed
any interest the state might have had in being relieved of its obligation to the
federal government. Id.
56. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290.
57. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the "FmHA regulations prescribe noti-
fication substantially equivalent to that mandated by state law. Indeed, in opera-
tion, the FmHA administrative regulations and procedures appeal to offer
mortgagors greater protection than the state statutes." Id. For a discussion of
the significance of the pertinent state and federal regulations governing the re.
spective procedures, see supra notes 25, 28, 34 and accompanying text.
58. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. Rivera had never applied for participation in
the program, though her legal counsel, Neighborhood Legal Services, clearly
was familiar with the program. Id. The court felt that this supported the as-
sumption that Rivera was probably ineligible for that program. Id. Thus, "noti-
fication of that which is already known-and which would be of no utility in any
event-is not a circumstance which would Justify an exception to general provi-
sions of law." Id. For a discussion of the protections afforded by state law, in-
cluding the possibility of refinancing, see supra notes 23-25.
59. Spears. 859 F.2d at 291.
60. Id. This statement by the court is inconsistent with the court's clear
reliance on the reasoning of both the Kimbell and Walter Dunlap decisions
throughout its opinion. For example, the Spears court applied the Kimbell three-
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was the controlling decision. 6 1 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that
adoption of state law as the proper rule of decision was not necessary
and that "the FmHA should be permitted to carry out its task of serv-
icing mortgages under the procedures it selects. ' '6 2 The Third Circuit
prong test to the facts in Spears to find that uniformity was not required in ad-
ministration of the FmHA programs, and to find that use of state law would not
interfere with the efficient implementation of the agency's programs. Id. at 290.
Further, the Spears court's holding, while admittedly different from the Kimbell
and lValter Dunlap holdings, was reached by applying the crucial factor of the
Kimbell test-whether commercial interests would be harmed by application of a
federal regulation, rather than a state law. Id. at 290-91. For a further discus-
sion of the relationships among the holdings in these three cases, see infra notes
87-89 and accompanying text.
61. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. For a discussion of the similarity between the
reasoning that resulted in the Kimbell and Walter Dunlap holdings and the reason-
ing that produced the West Virginia and Spears decisions, see infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text.
62. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. The Third Circuit also briefly examined two
minor issues-whether the foreclosure proceedings satisfied due process re-
quirements and whether the agency's finding that Rivera had abandoned the
property was supported by the facts of the case.
Concerning the due process issue, the Third Circuit found that the FmHA
regulations concerning foreclosure satisfied due process requirements on their
face. Id. at 290 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1475, 14 80(g), (k) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986);
7 C.F.R. § 1955.15 (1986)).
Next, the court found that the facts of Spears indicated that the regulations
as applied to Rivera satisfied due process requirements. Id. The court found
that the defendant had more than enough notice of the FmHA's impending ac-
tion and more than enough time to present her case in a hearing. Id. The Third
Circuit noted that the first letter from the FmHA to Rivera indicating the
FmHA's intention to foreclose was sent on January 18, 1983. Id. Although that
letter indicated that foreclosure proceedings would begin within 20 days if no
action was taken by the debtor, the FmHA did not begin foreclosure proceed-
ings within the 20-day period. Id. Rivera received further notice of impending
foreclosure in the form of another letter dated March 16, 1984. Id. That letter,
too, indicated that because of Rivera's default on her loan, the FmHA planned
to "accelerate the loan and foreclose on the mortgage" beginning 60 days after
the date on the letter. Id. The letter also outlined a procedure that Rivera could
follow in order to schedule a hearing on the matter. Id. Again, the FmHA failed
to take action within the period set out in the letter. Id. In fact, foreclosure
proceedings did not begin until 1985, at which time Rivera requested a hearing.
Id. Thus, the Third Circuit found that it was reasonable to conclude that Rivera
had adequate notice of the impending foreclosure proceedings and that, conse-
quently, "due process considerations do not dictate the choice [of state or fed-
eral law]." Id. For a further discussion of the significance of the fact that the
FmHA regulations substantially fulfilled the Pennsylvania notice requirements,
see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
Concerning the agency's finding that Rivera had abandoned her property,
thereby triggering the foreclosure proceedings, the Third Circuit first examined
the facts supporting that finding. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291-92. The Third Circuit
found significant the facts that Rivera had not responded to any of the FmHA's
letters regarding the impending foreclosure on the mortgage, that she had not
made any payments towards discharging her debt, that she had not in any way
maintained the property and that she had lived in another house to which she
and her husband had title while in Puerto Rico. Id. The court also noted the
fact that Rivera contacted the FmHA once during the period, and at that time
15
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declared that the district court's order requiring the FmHA to comply
with Pennsylvania's statutes should be vacated and the case remanded to
that court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the government.,"
IV. ANALYSIS
On its face, the holding in Spears seems to contradict both the con-
trolling Supreme Court and Third Circuit decisions on the issue of
whether a federal agency must comply with a state's laws when it utilizes
federal courts to collect its security interests. In the Kimbell and Walter
Dunlap cases, the government was forced to comply with state laws which
determined the status of its security interests. 64 Distinguishing Spears on
its facts, the Third Circuit declared that it would not follow the holdings
in Kimbell and Walter Dunlap and, consequently, did not use state law to
give content to the applicable federal law. 65 Instead, it found that the
government could proceed to collect its security interest in accordance
with the applicable FmHA regulations. 66 While this may seem inconsis-
tent with the earlier decisions, it is submitted that the reasoning in Spears
is in accord with the rationale of the previous cases.
In Kimbell and Walter Dunlap, suits arose because of competing gov-
ernment and private security interests in the collateral in question." 7 It
is submitted that the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit concluded
that application of state law was appropriate, perhaps even mandated in
those cases, primarily to protect the private third parties who had relied
on state law to perfect their security interests and assure that their in-
vestments were safe.68 In those cases, the courts found that protecting
agreed to turn the property over to the government. Id. at 292. Noting that
"[o]ur standard of review, as well as that of the district court, is limited," the
Third Circuit found that, taking into consideration the deference it was obliged
to afford the agency's findings, "[i]n light of Ms. Rivera's expressed willingness
on two occasions to convey the property to the government, her failure to ar-
range for any payments, and her absence for more than a year before making
inquiry about returning, we cannot say that the agency's determination of aban-
donment lacks substantial evidence." Id.
63. Spears, 859 F.2d at 292.
64. For a discussion of Walter Dunlap, see supra note 48 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Kimbell, see supra note 37 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Spears, see supra notes 11-63 and accompanying text.
65. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291.
66. Id. The Third Circuit stated, "the FmHA should be permitted to carry
out its task of servicing mortgages under the procedures it selects.... [T]he
FmHA need not comply with [Pennsylvania's pre-foreclosure statutes] whenever
it chooses to utilize the federal court to foreclose on a mortgage in Penn-
sylvania." Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's reasoning behind this con-
clusion, see supra notes 29-63 and accompanying text.
67. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 718-20, 723-25; W1'alter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1234-35.
For a discussion of the factual setting in Kimbell, see supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the dispute in llaller Dunlap, see supra note 48
and accompanying text.
68. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739-41; Il'aller Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239. The
550 [Vol. 34: p. 535
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the government's security interests was less important than protecting
the stability of the commercial communities of the several states.1'1
Those cases advanced the governmental policy of encouraging com-
merce, a policy which the Kimbell court seemed to feel was evidenced by
Congress' failure to statutorily grant priority to all government liens.7 1,
In Spears, there was no third party competing with the government
Kimbell Court, in evaluating the harm that applying a federal rule would have on
the interested commercial parties, noted that those parties had relied "on state
commercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation of the
risks involved." Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739 (citations omitted). The Court felt that
failing to protect these interests by applying state law would subject interests,
previously regarded as secure, to unforeseeable consequences. Id. Taking an
even broader view, the Court implied that promulgation of a rule which would
allow any "federal contractual security interest [to] suddenly appear [I and
[take] precedence" over properly perfected private liens could alter the entire
fabric of commercial relations. Id. Because the Court was unwilling to subject
private interests to such uncertain fates, it found that it could not do other than
to adopt the "readymade body of state law." Id. at 740.
In Walter Dunlap, the Third Circuit, relying on Kimbell, found that the federal
regulations in question, which would allow the FmHA to collect the broker's
commission on a sale of property which secured the agency's loan, were not
"explicit 'congressional directive[s]' that [would] displace the application of
state law as the federal rule of decision." Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239. As a
result, the federal regulations were not sufficiently definite for the court to apply
when, as a result of doing so, "the conduct of third parties having no relation-
ship with the agency is affected." Id. at 1238. The Walter Dunlap court found
"that giving the effect of law to a variety of regulations by a number of agencies
would be particularly disruptive to the stability of commercial law." Id. at 1239.
In order to avoid such a disruptive effect on commercial law in the state, the
court "decline[d] to accept the government's position that the regulations con-
trol." Id. (citations omitted).
69. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739-40; Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239. It is
important to note that the Kimbell Court recognized that some circumstances
could arise in which the government's interest was so strong that a federal rule
would be applied in spite of its effect on commercial relationships based on state
law. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 740. Specifically, the Court stated that "formulating
special rules to govern the priority of the federal consensual liens in issue here
would be justified if necessary to vindicate important national interests." Id.
In this regard, it is important to recall the Kimbell Court's earlier assertion
that, according to its own decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363 (1943), federal courts could formulate federal rules to give content to
federal law in areas in which Congress had not spoken "according to their own
standards." Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 727 (citing Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367). The
Kimbell Court also found that the decision to adopt a judicially fashioned federal
rule or a state law in cases such as Kinibell was a matter of 'judicial policy." Id. at
728. In light of these comments, it is difficult to determine with any degree of
accuracy the future actions of courts which have to determine a choice of law
question based on their own discretionary determination of the relative impor-
tance of federal and private liens.
70. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 735. The Court stated, "Iw]e believe that had Con-
gress intended the private commercial sector, rather than taxpayers in general,
to bear the risks of default entailed by these public welfare programs, it would
have established a priority scheme displacing state law." Id.
The Third Circuit agreed with this reasoning in Walter Dunlap. The court in
that case stated, "there is no indication that Congress intended an agency regu-
17
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for possession of the property. 7 1 In addition, Congress specifically em-
powered the FmHA to promulgate foreclosure notice procedures.
7 2
Had there been third party competing interests involved in Spears, the
Third Circuit may have applied Pennsylvania state law in the name of
protecting the third party's reliance on that state law in his business
transactions; however, in a case involving a notice statute substantially
similar in its provisions to the agency regulations at issue, very little
would be gained in terms of protecting third parties by requiring com-
pliance with the state, rather than the federal procedure. 73 The Third
Circuit's opinion does suggest that in a case in which a third party credi-
tor would be harmed by application of the appropriate federal regula-
tions, the FmHA would be forced to comply with the Pennsylvania
lation to supersede long-standing uniform state law in this area." Walter Dunlap,
800 F.2d at 1239.
71. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1480 (1982). Section 14 8 0(g) provides that the FmHA Sec-
retary is empowered to
issue rules and regulations which assure that applicants denied assist-
ance under this subchapter or persons or organizations whose assist-
ance under this subchapter is being substantially reduced or terminated
are given written notice of the reasons for denial, reduction or termina-
tion and are provided at least an opportunity to appeal an adverse deci-
sion and to present additional information relevant to that decision to a
person, other than the person making the original determination, who
has authority to reverse the decision.
Id. § 1480(g).
Under this directive, the FmHA promulgated the notice provisions which
were followed in Spears. See Spears, 859 F.2d at 285-86; Regulations of the De-
partment of Agriculture, 7 C.F.R. § 1955.15 (1988).
Thus, Congress provided express statutory guidance for the FmHA to fol-
low when it promulgated foreclosure notice procedures. Yet, when determining
whether to apply a uniform federal rule or state law, the Spears court failed to
mention this congressional guidance. In addition, the court failed to address the
issue of preemption.
73. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. As the Spears court noted, "[from the stand-
point of mortgagors in general, no overriding benefit flows from insistence on
state procedures." Id. The Third Circuit noted the fact that the federal provi-
sions governing moratoria on loans in default were as protective of the debtor as
the state refinancing provisions. Id. For further discussion of the court's rea-
soning, see supra note 30. The court was correct in this regard, as examination
of the provisions in question reveals. Both federal regulations and state laws
provide for the cessation of foreclosure procedures upon a showing by the
debtor that the circumstances of the case require such action. For the text of the
Pennsylvania statutes, see supra notes 23-24. For a discussion of the federal pro-
visions, see supra note 28.
Regarding the protection offered to third parties, it seems clear that when
federal provisions allow the federal government to foreclose on its lien pursuant
to a certain set of procedures, and state provisions allow foreclosure by any
mortgagee or mortgage lender pursuant to substantially the same procedures, a
third party would not benefit by application of one set of procedures over the
other. The property would be "available" for seizure by the lienholder(s) at the
same time without regard to which procedures were implemented. Conse-
quently, the value of adopting state law in such a case would be limited at best.
[Vol. 34: p. 535
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statutes upon which the non-governmental lenders had relied in grant-
ing the loans in question.7 4 However, the court does not suggest what
the result might be in a case in which application of one set of regula-
tions over the other produces no substantial detriment to either party.
It is difficult to ascertain what the resolution of this issue might be in the
Third Circuit, but an appropriate analysis might include a determination
of whether the federal government was aware of the commercial lien
when it accepted the property in question as security for its loan, or
conversely, whether the commercial lienholder had notice of a previous
federal lien.7 5 A party who takes a security interest with knowledge of a
previously perfected interest could reasonably expect that his lien is
preceeded by another and that, consequently, he might not have
priority.
Despite the Third Circuit's declaration that due to the factual set-
ting in Spears the Kimbell-Walter Dunlap analysis did not apply, close ex-
amination of the Third Circuit's reasoning in Spears reveals that it is in
fact consistent with the reasoning in Kimbell and Walter Dunlap.76 The
Kimbell-Walter Dunlap analysis involves an evaluation of three criteria:
(1) the probable effect that preemption of the state lien system would
have on third parties with commercial interests in the property; (2) the
extent of the federal lending agencies' need for a uniform federal sys-
tem; and (3) an evaluation of the possibility that application of state law
could frustrate the objectives of the federal lending program. 77
Applying this three-part analysis to the facts of Kimbell and Walter
Dunlap reveals that in both cases significant harm to third parties with
commercial interests would have resulted from the preemption of state
law. Additionally, the administration of the federal programs them-
selves indicated that a uniform standard was not necessary to the
smooth functioning of the federal program, and the application of state
law would not frustrate the objectives of the programs. 7 8 Thus, in those
74. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. The Third Circuit stated, "[blecause no commer-
cial interests or third parties are affected by the utilization of federal procedures,
the rationale of the Kimbell-Walter Dunlap analysis is not controlling." Id. (em-
phasis added). The implication in this statement is that had there been a com-
peting interest, the Kimbell-Walter Dunlap analysis would have controlled and the
government would have been forced to comply with the state laws upon which
the competing parties had structured their security interests.
75. See United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.N.D. 1986)
("Although the redemption period [adopted by the court] affects the rights of
junior lienholders, these junior lienholders, for the most part, should be aware
of the FmHA's lien."). For a discussion of the facts and holding in Elverud, see
infra note 85.
76. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291. For a discussion of the Spears court's use of the
Kimbell-Walter Dunlap analysis, see supra notes 37-46 & 48-53 and accompanying
text.
77. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728-29.
78. See id. at 729. The Kimbell court stated that "[w]e are unpersuaded that,
in the circumstances presented here, nationwide standards favoring claims of
19
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cases the courts found that application of state law to the situation
would protect commercial interests to a great extent, while at the same
time it would not harm the government's interests.9
In Spears, the Third Circuit found that, as in Kimbell and Walter Dun-
lap, no uniform standard was necessary to the smooth functioning of the
FmHA. 8() This was evidenced by the language in the mortgage contracts
which indicated a willingness, if not an obligation, to abide by state
law. 8 ' Using the same evidence, the court found that application of
state law would not frustrate the objectives of the FmHA's program.8 2
However, the Spears court found that no third parties were at risk in that
case, distinguishing it from Kimbell and Walter Dunlap, and that in such a
situation, delaying the government's satisfaction was unnecessary.8 3
Thus, the Third Circuit found that it was appropriate to allow the FmHA
the United States are necessary to ease program administration or to safeguard
the Federal Treasury from defaulting debtors. Because the state commercial
codes 'furnish convenient solutions in no way inconsistent with adequate protec-
tion of the federal interest[s],' we decline to override intricate state laws of gen-
eral applicability on which private creditors base their daily commercial
transactions." Id. (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309
(1947)). In Kimbell, if as the district court held, federal rules premised on the tax
lien priority system were the proper rules to apply, Kimbell's lien would have
fallen because it was not sufficiently "choate" at the time the government's lien
was perfected. Id. at 720-21. Clearly this would have caused Kimbell significant
harm. Balanced against this harm was the questionable harm that the govern-
ment would suffer if Kimbell was allowed to enforce his lien according to his
judgment. The Court found, based on its own precedent, that application of
state law would work "no hardship on the agency." Id. at 730. Therefore, the
court found that state law was the proper rule of decision in Kimbell.
In Walter Dunlap, the government claimed that the debtor had not correctly
applied the proceeds from the sale of the property securing the government's
loan. Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1237. Further, the government claimed that,
pursuant to federal regulations, the entire proceeds from the sale were subject
to the federal lien and all monies were to be paid to the government or to the
government and the debtorjointly. Id. at 1237-38. Walter Dunlap claimed that
under state law the proceeds were not subject to the federal lien because the
mortgage instrument contemplated sale of the property and completion of such
a contemplated sale acted as a waiver of the lien by the government. Id. at 1237.
The Walter Dunlap court relied on Kimbell in finding that in such a case, state law
was the proper rule of decision. Id. at 1239.
79. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739-40; Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239.
80. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290. The Spears court stated that "no need for na-
tional uniformity is present." Id. For a discussion of this portion of the Spears
court's decision, see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
81. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290. For a discussion of the portion of the Spears
court's decision dealing with interpretation of the mortgage contract, see supra
notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
82. Spears, 859 F.2d at 290. The court found that applying state law would
not "always frustrate the aims of the federal program." Id. If a court finds that,
in fact, application of state law would impact negatively on effective advance-
ment of the agency's objectives, it is quite likely that a federal rule will be ap-
plied. For a discussion of such cases, see infra note 96 and accompanying text.
83. Spears, 859 F.2d at 291.
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to foreclose according to its own rules and not delay any longer.8 4 It is
submitted that the similarity in the reasoning in the three cases, coupled
with the differences in the holdings, indicates that future Third Circuit
decisions in such situations will turn on the presence or absence of inter-
ested third parties.
8 5
While the Third Circuit's characterization of the Supreme Court's
decision in West Virginia v. United States8 6 as "controlling" seems inap-
propriate in view of its heavy reliance on the Kimbell analysis in its opin-
ion, it is submitted that this characterization can be explained by
recognizing that the West Virginia court adhered loosely to the Kimbell
test, and also by noting that the factual setting of Spears more closely
resembled the factual setting in West Virginia than the factual setting in
either Kimbell or Walter Dunlap.87 Further, it was appropriate for the
Third Circuit to rely on all three cases because the Kimbell-Walter Dunlap
and West Virginia analyses are both geared toward furthering the same
84. Id.
85. Cases from other jurisdictions, however, indicate that this may not be
the case. See, e.g., United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.D. 1986). In
Elverud, as in Spears, the debtors were the aggrieved parties seeking relief from
foreclosure by the FmHA. Id. at 693. The debtors in Elverud were seeking appli-
cation of North Dakota's one-year redemption period, rather than application of
the 60-day redemption period sought by the government. Id. at 694-95. The
Elverud court applied the Kimbell three-part test to determine that a specially for-
mulated federal rule, rather than the state law, would give content to the federal
law in that case. Id. at 695.
The Elverud court cited Kimbell and an Eighth Circuit case, United States v.
Chappell Livestock Auction, Inc., 523 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1975), in support of the
proposition that the FmHA did not require uniformity in administration of its
programs. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 695. In Elverud, however, the court found
that application of the state law in these circumstances could interfere with the
efficient implementation of the purposes of the agency. Id. at 696. With regard
to the third prong of the Kimbell test, the district court in Elverud found that
"[t]he loan transaction between Elverud and the FmHA does not interfere with
commercial relationships of third parties." Id. Based on these determinations,
the court found that application of state law was improper. Id.
Following its specific holding, the Elverud court seemed to suggest that it
might reach the same result in a case in which third parties were involved. Id. The
court stated, "[a]lthough the redemption period [adopted by the court] affects
the rights of junior lien holders, these junior lien holders, for the most part,
should be aware of the FmHA's lien." Id.
This statement seems to indicate that the court felt that mere notice of an
FmHA lien was enough to justify applying a federal rule that favored the govern-
ment, even if such an action disadvantaged junior lien holders. But see United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966) (where notice of state law preventing en-
forcement ofjudgments given to federal agency seeking to enforce its judgment
led to application of state law in question to disadvantage of government). For
further discussion of Yazell, see supra note 5.
86. 479 U.S. 305 (1987).
87. Spears and West Virginia involved only the United States and the debtor
as parties. In contrast, Kimbell and Walter Dunlap involved the United States and
private creditors of the debtor as parties. For a discussion of this aspect of these
cases, see supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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public policy goals-encouraging stability in the business community by
protecting transactions based on state law by not giving the government
preferential treatment. 88
It is submitted that because the result in Spears is so fact sensitive, it
will have, in and of itself, little value in cases involving any creditor other
than the government. However, it seems likely that the importance of
Spears lies in its value as a gap-filler. That is to say, the Spears decision
articulates what seems to be only implied in Walter Dunlap-that in a case
in which no third party would be adversely affected by the application of
federal rules rather than state law, the former course of action could
properly be taken by the courts.8 9 The two lines of reasoning articu-
lated by the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit in Kimbell-Walter Dun-
lap and West Virginia-Spears will provide practitioners in the Third Circuit
with a very workable formula. When a third party will be harmed if a
government lien is given priority under federal regulations, state law,
which presumably will protect the private lien holder, will be applied. "°
When no third party is in danger of economic harm, federal law may
appropriately be applied. 9 1
It is further submitted that the facts in Spears require the result
reached by the Third Circuit. In this respect, it seems particularly im-
portant to note that the regulations which the court allowed the FmHA
to use in Spears substantially fulfilled the purpose of the state statutes
88. See West Virginia, 479 U.S. at 309; Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739-40; Wlalter
Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1239.
89. See WI'alter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1238. The Third Circuit stated, "[a] regu-
lation which is to be treated as having the force of law, at a minimum, should
have the definitiveness associated with statutory language when, as here, the conduct
of third parties having no relationship with the agency is affected." Id. (emphasis added).
Though this statement by the court comes at a section of the opinion in which
the clarity of the language of the federal regulations is under examination,
rather than in an examination of the choice between the federal regulation and
the state law, the importance of the presence of a third party is clear. It is likely
that, had there been no third party requiring protection in Walter Dunlap, the
Third Circuit would have granted the regulation in question "the force of law"
by allowing it to give content to the applicable federal law, in spite of its lack of
"definitiveness."
90. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 708 F.2d 804, 813
(1st Cir. 1983) (court applied Maine law to find that lien held by subcontractor
was superior to mortgage assigned to HUD when developer defaulted on loan
and held that "the formulation of rules to ensure predictability and stability in
relationships among the parties to construction projects is primarily a matter of
local concern. Absent compelling reasons to displace state law, the relationships
are best governed by those local rules.").
91. See United States v. Landmark Park & Assoc., 795 F.2d 683, 686 (8th
Cir. 1986) (in suit between HUD and debtor, "[p]rotection of the federal treas-
ury and the purposes and integrity of nationwide federal lending programs" is
important federal interest to be protected by application of federal rules). But see
In Re Bubert, 61 Bankr. 362, 366 (W.D. Tex. 1986) (in suit between SBA and
debtor over applicability of Texas homestead exception to judgment collection
procedures, state homestead law applied to provide commercial concerns with
"stability in allocating risk in their commercial transactions").
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that Rivera sought to impose on the agency.92 It seems clear that in a
case involving a government creditor who wishes to foreclose under an
agency regulation which subverts the purpose of an existing state law,
harming the debtor (the only other party with an interest in the matter)
in the process, a court may reach a result quite different from the result
in Spears, and would be justified in doing so.
It is clear that the reasoning espoused in Spears, derived from the
United States Supreme Court's reasoning in Kimbell, is applicable in
cases involving the Small Business Administration 93 and the FmHA.
'94
The Kimbell analysis has also proved useful in cases involving other fed-
eral agencies that occasionally find themselves to be holders of security
interests with uncertain priority,9 5 such as the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Company (FDIC) 96 and the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD). 9 7 Additionally, in similar actions not involving
federal lending programs, cases have tended to favor the application of
state law for essentially the same reason articulated in Kimbell-applying
state law tends to perpetuate security and predictability in the state
courts .98
92. The Third Circuit stated, "FmHA regulations prescribe notification
substantially equivalent to that mandated by state law." Spears, 859 F.2d at 291.
For the text of the relevant Pennsylvania statutes, see supra notes 23-24 and ac-
companying text.
93. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 715. For a discussion of Kimbell, see supra note
37 and accompanying text.
94. See Spears, 859 F.2d at 284. For a discussion of Spears, see supra notes
11-63 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Trigo v. FDIC, 847 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Bank of
San Francisco, 817 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Landmark Park &
Assoc., 795 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1986); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village
Assoc., 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692
(D.N.D. 1986); In Re Bubert, 61 Bankr. 362 (W.D. Tex. 1986). See generally Greig
& Althoff, supra note 37, at 451.
96. Case law seems to suggest that in cases involving the FDIC, a uniform
federal rule will be applied. See, e.g., D'oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447, 459 (1942) (protection of FDIC programs found to be of paramount inter-
est requiring application of uniform federal rule). Accord Trigo v. FDIC, 847
F.2d 1499, 1502 n.4 (11 th Cir. 1988); FDIC v. Bank of San Francisco, 817 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1987). But see FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (10th
Cir. 1987) ("We are aware of no federal policy or need for uniformity that would
be frustrated by incorporating the law of Oklahoma as the federal rule of deci-
sion in this case."). For a discussion of the treatment of liens held by the FDIC,
see generally Note, Formulating a Federal Rule of Decision in Commercial Transactions
After Kimbell, 66 IowA L. REV. 391 (1981).
97. See United States v. Landmark Park & Assoc., 795 F.2d 683 (8th Cir.
1986); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assoc., 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir.
1983). For a discussion of Landmark Park, see supra note 91. For a discussion of
Chicago Title, see supra note 90.
98. See, e.g., Northern Group Servs. v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85,
94 (6th Cir. 1987) (Michigan law governing coordination of benefits by no-fault
auto insurers was not preempted by Employee Retirement Income Security Act
provisions covering benefits because application of federal regulations "would
undermine the general authority and autonomy the states now enjoy in their
1989]
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V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is submitted that Spears was properly decided. In
holding for the government, the Third Circuit has established a rule that
protects the federal government's interest in collecting its debts in cases
in which the only competing interest-that of the debtor-clearly should
not take precedence over the government's interest.9 9 At the same
time, the Spears decision protects commercial interests by leaving viable
the holding in Walter Dunlap, which courts in the Third Circuit can apply
in cases in which commercial interests based on state law would be
harmed by application of a federal rule which made federal agency liens
superior to pre-existing private liens.10 0 In view of the combined effect
of the Walter Dunlap and Spears decisions, it seems likely that attorneys
representing debtors and their private creditors in the Third Circuit will
be able to more accurately assess the possibility that a federal rule will
be applied to the detriment of their clients.
Deborah R. Popky
regulation of insurance."), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1754 (1988); Morgan v. South
Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1986) (In civil
rights action brought by demoted black school principal, Indiana state law gov-
erned power of school superintendent and school board attorney to settle claim
because "[r]ules should be as simple and predictable as possible; the 'borrow-
ing' of state law will achieve this.").
99. The weight of authority seems clearly to be on the side of the govern-
ment in cases involving only the government and a debtor. See D'oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (case involving FDIC and debtor); Spears,
859 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1988) (case involving FmHA and debtor); United States v.
Landmark Park & Assoc., 795 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1986) (case involving HUD and
debtor); United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692 (D.N.D. 1986) (case involv-
ing FmHA and debtor).
For a discussion of the holding in Spears, see supra notes 29-62 and accom-
panying text. For a general discussion of the importance of the contractual na-
ture of FmHA mortgage arrangements, see Centner, supra note 1, at 415.
100. It seems clear that in cases involving interested third parties, the bal-
ance tips in favor of the private lien holder. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v.
Sherred Village Assoc., 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Chicago
Title, see supra note 90. For a discussion of the Spears court's use of the Walter
Dunlap analysis in its opinion, see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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